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Pearson’s Wrong Turning: Against
Statistical Measures of Causal Efficacy
Robert Northcott†‡
Standard statistical measures of strength of association, although pioneered by Pearson
deliberately to be acausal, nowadays are routinely used to measure causal efficacy. But
their acausal origins have left them ill suited to this latter purpose. I distinguish between
two different conceptions of causal efficacy, and argue that: (1) Both conceptions can
be useful; (2) The statistical measures only attempt to capture the first of them; (3)
They are not fully successful even at this; (4) An alternative definition based more
squarely on causal thinking not only captures the second conception, but also can
capture the first one better too.
1. Introduction. Karl Pearson, one of the brilliant founders of modern
statistics, was also a fervent opponent of the concept of causation, re-
garding it as unscientific metaphysical speculation. In the 1911 edition of
his The Grammar of Science, he described it as “another fetish amidst the
inscrutable arcana of even modern science” (vi), and elsewhere as a “fan-
tasy” (122) and a “conceptual bondage” (165). His correlation coefficient
r was from the start intended as a “measure of the intensity of association”
(160), and thus in his eyes as a replacement for talk of causation. This is
reflected in its definition:1
2 2r p [Cov (XY )] / Var (X ) 7Var (Y ).
True to Pearson’s positivism, it is defined purely in terms of actual data.
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of
Missouri–St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall (MC 73), One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO
63121-4499. e-mail: northcottr@umsl.edu.
‡I would like to thank Nancy Cartwright, and the audience at the Experimental Phi-
losophy Laboratory at University of California, San Diego, for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this paper.
1. It is common to summarize the strength of correlation between X and Y by citing
r 2 rather than r, since this enables both positive and negative correlations to be com-
pared directly.
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Further, variables X and Y are treated entirely symmetrically and there
is no appeal to causation anywhere.
Of course, actually causation did not disappear from scientific practice
in the way that Pearson had anticipated. Moreover when, as is frequently
the case nowadays, background knowledge suggests one of X and Y to
be the cause of the other, Pearson’s r is normally (indeed can hardly not
be) interpreted as a measure of causal efficacy—how much, or how strong,
an impact does the cause variable have on the effect variable? But this
latterday embracing of causation is not reflected in r2’s formulation,
which—faithful to Pearson’s original anti-causal metaphysical commit-
ment—remains unchanged. Similar remarks apply to the measure of
causal efficacy yielded by Ronald Fisher’s analysis of variance technique
(ANOVA), which again is at heart a ratio of variances. For reasons of
space I shall concentrate henceforth on r2 rather than ANOVA, but
throughout analogous arguments will apply also to the latter, and indeed
to other related statistical measures, such as genetic heritability.
In summary, long after Pearson’s hostility to causation has been aban-
doned, still its influence on the form of statistical measures of causal
efficacy has persisted. The result, I shall argue in this paper, has been
baleful.
2. Two Conceptions of Causal Efficacy. How important a cause of heart
attacks is a bad diet? Such a question can be understood in two distinct
ways: First, how important a cause is diet compared to other causes of
heart attacks, i.e., a relative conception; or second, how important a cause
is diet in its own right, i.e. an absolute conception. Label these two notions
of causal efficacy respectively CErel and CEabs. Imagine you were won-
dering whether to improve your diet for the sake of your heart. You might
want to know diet’s relative importance, and whether it is worth devoting
your energies to this rather than to other factors such as exercising or
quitting smoking. The CErel of bad diet would be relevant to this inquiry.
Alternatively, you might be interested instead in how much impact fixing
diet would have in its own right. For instance, if you have already quit
smoking and started exercising, and are pondering now whether to take
this extra step. For this latter question, it is a bad diet’s CEabs that would
be relevant.
One can think of the CErel sense of causal efficacy as being intimately
associated with significance tests. These must first measure what propor-
tion of total ‘noise’, so to speak, a factor is responsible for, before then
deciding whether such a proportion can reasonably be assigned to mere
chance. One can think of CEabs, by contrast, as being intimately associated
with Galilean idealization, whereby we are concerned with isolating the
impact of one factor alone. In this case, far from the causal efficacy being
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in part a function of the level of background noise (as with CErel), we are
concerned precisely to discover its value having abstracted all such noise
away. How strong, for instance, is the general tendency of a block to
accelerate down a slope, independent of ‘noise’ such as friction and air
resistance? Thus CErel is deliberately a function in part of background
noise, whereas CEabs (at least in intention) deliberately is not.
Of our two (as yet somewhat informal) understandings of causal effi-
cacy, the statistical measures r2 and ANOVA both attempt to capture
CErel. Roughly speaking, for instance, r
2 expresses the proportion of the
total (including ‘background noise’) variation of two variables
( ) explained just by their covariation ( ).2 In aVar (X ) 7Var (Y ) Cov (XY )
plot of data points relating two variables X and Y, the r2 statistic would
tell us how tightly those points cluster around a line of best fit. This is
appropriate for CErel. But the CEabs sense of efficacy would be more in-
terested in how much of an increase in Y is yielded by a unit-increase in
X. This would at best3 correspond (for each point) to the slope of the line
from that point to the origin. The average CEabs across the sample of data
points would then be the average of these slopes, which is independent
of how closely those points cluster round a line of best fit. Thus I conclude
that r2 cannot be a good measure of CEabs. This explains why r
2 and
ANOVA are commonly used in significance testing,4 and why they are
not commonly used in those contexts, such as in physics, where Galilean
idealization—and hence use of CEabs—plays a larger role. For similar
reasons, it is the CEabs sense (and hence not our statistical measures) that
is embraced in much of everyday life too, and also in most of the existing
philosophical coverage.5
Since the statistical measures therefore capture only one of the two
2. On the relation between variance and effect, see Section 4. ANOVA’s formula is
(approximately): Var(cause)/Var(total effect), again standardly interpreted as the pro-
portion of total effect explained by the cause.
3. Even this would be neglecting the issue of choice of counterfactual—see Section 6.
4. In this paper I do not address any epistemological issues such as causal inference
or hypothesis testing. Rather, the focus is exclusively on the conceptual issue of what
we understand by causal efficacy once given a cause and effect.
5. Regarding the philosophical literature, see for instance Good 1961 and Miller 1987.
The machinery of Bayes nets and causal graphs has also from the start assumed the
CEabs understanding of causal efficacy (Spirtes et al. 2000, Pearl 2000). The critiques
there of statistical practice mainly concern techniques of causal inference from statistical
data, not conceptions of causal efficacy. To my knowledge, Sober et al. 1992 and
especially Sober 1988 are the only philosophical treatments that discuss this paper’s
distinction between CEabs and CErel.
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senses of causal efficacy, I propose an alternative definition to fill the gap.6
Let the efficacy of a cause C with respect to an effect E be
E(C & W ) E(C & W ),0
where W is background conditions, and C0 a baseline counterfactual level
of C. In the simplest case, C0 will just be the absence of C. Any value for
the efficacy of C will be relativized both to the levels of other causes of
E (reflected in the background conditions W) and also to the choice of
C0. In essence, the first of these relativizations is just the logic of controlled
experiment—to assess the impact of introducing the factor C, we want
to keep constant everything else causally relevant. The second relativi-
zation captures the way in which the efficacy ascribed to a cause also
depends on what contrast class we are comparing it to. Several further
technicalities7 are inessential here, so I shall gloss over them.
This formula, I claim, captures the CEabs sense of causal efficacy, since
consideration of how extraneous factors vary is now explicitly excluded.
Notice also how, in direct contrast to r2 earlier, the variables C and E are
treated asymmetrically, reflecting the asymmetry of cause and effect. Ex-
plicit reference is made to causation, and the controlled-experiment sen-
sibility with regard to W is unmotivated without it.8
3. Are the Two Conceptions Being Confused? So we have two different
conceptions of causal efficacy, namely CErel and CEabs. Standard meth-
odology in biology and psychology, among other sciences, endorses the
statistical measures and hence implicitly the CErel conception. But in these
cases, is the CErel conception always really the one we are actually inter-
ested in? Many times, I shall argue, it is not. Accordingly, many times
there will be an unstated conflation of the two notions, implicit in the
presentation of the statistical (and hence CErel) result when the explan-
andum in question suggests that we are actually interested instead in the
CEabs one. Only a full survey of many applications could demonstrate
this conflation conclusively. To make it seem plausible in the space avail-
6. The following formula assumes that cause and effect have already been specified;
it is not intended as a definition of causation itself.
7. For instance, strictly speaking the W in the left-hand term is different from that in
the right-hand term, since the switch from C0 to C will in general alter additional
things in the world besides our effect of interest. Other omitted technicalities include
how to interpret C0 in cases where the absence of a cause is not well defined, extension
to probabilistic rather than deterministic causation, and plenty more besides.
8. Note also that the formula is quantitative, thus allowing degrees of causal efficacy.
This disarms one of Pearson’s major complaints against causation, namely his con-
ception of it as being an unsatisfactorily all-or-nothing affair.
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TABLE 1. TOPICS OF r2 ANALYSES.
First Variable (Presumed Cause) Second Variable (Presumed Effect)
Percentage of births to unmarried
mothers
Percentage of newborns under 2.5 kg
Consumption of saturated fats Chance of suffering atherosclerosis
Number of voluntary homework prob-
lems completed
Score in final exam
Early life exposure to radioactive iodine
fall-out from nuclear tests
Later score in SATs
Quantity of smoking Life expectancy
Quantity of body fat in female profes-
sional golfers
Golf score
IQ of college students GPA
Hours working in front of a computer
screen
Subsequent score in a test of depth-
perception
able here, I list the subjects of several actual r2 analyses. In each case, the
choices of variable clearly suggest a particular cause and effect relation,
and so the degrees of correlation ought indeed to be interpreted as causal
efficacies (see Table 1).9 In each case, are we interested in CErel or CEabs?
Often, we could plausibly be interested in either. The safest judgment is
that there is no univocal answer, and that in different circumstances, either
conception of causal efficacy has its place. But it already follows imme-
diately that therefore in many of these studies the wrong measure of causal
efficacy has been used. All, remember, are using r2. But that is aimed only
at CErel, so in every case where we are actually interested in CEabs, its use
was inappropriate.10
In the rest of this paper I shall argue that the situation is in fact even
worse than that. For even on its home field, so to speak, r2 is still un-
satisfactory. That is, even in those cases where we are indeed interested
in CErel, still r
2 carries other serious drawbacks. Furthermore, our formula
for CEabs from Section 2 can be adapted so as also to capture CErel, and
moreover it avoids those drawbacks attending r2. It should therefore be
declared the preferable measure for both types of causal efficacy. Similar
remarks would apply to ANOVA. This suggests the final conclusion that,
with regard to defining causal efficacy, and notwithstanding their wide-
spread use for this purpose, these statistical measures should be discarded.
9. These are studies chosen by standard textbooks precisely to illustrate appropriate
usage. I take them therefore also to be cases of reputable work, and not unrepresen-
tatively sloppy. The textbooks themselves (Howell 1995, Kiess 1996, Sokal and Rohlf
1995) contain the individual references.
10. Sometimes—not always—a slope coefficient for a line of best fit is also presented.
This does do more to address the CEabs sense although, assuming the regression is least
squares, still the coefficient does not capture a sample’s average CEabs exactly. Note
also the points of Section 6.
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4. First Problem: Levels versus Variances. There exists a second distinc-
tion in how we think about causal efficacy, independent of that between
CErel and CEabs, and that is the distinction between levels and variances.
Since its significance in this context seems to have been almost nowhere
before discussed (Lewontin (1974) mentions it briefly with respect to
ANOVA), I shall devote some space to this issue particularly. Consider
the efficacy of (the announcement of) an interest rate cut with respect to
stock prices. We might be interested either in the direct impact of the
announcement on price levels (CEabs), or in the relative importance of
that impact compared to all the other determinants of stock prices (CErel).
In both cases, our focus will have been on the level of stock prices. But
suppose that we were interested not in their level but rather, like perhaps
a hedge fund manager, in their volatility. In this case our focus of interest
would not be stock price levels, but rather (some function of) the variance
of those price levels. That is, depending on our interest, we may be con-
cerned either with the level of some effect variable E, or with the variance
of that E.
Now, remember that r2 is couched in terms of variables’ variances and
covariances. The real problem turns out to be one of r2’s inflexibility—it
is not that a focus on variance is necessarily always inappropriate, but
rather that it sometimes will be. And rather as its definition forced r2 into
a commitment always to CErel rather than CEabs, so now it also forces it
into a commitment always to variances rather than levels. (Again, similar
remarks apply to ANOVA.)
To see this, consider a numerical illustration. Imagine two teams of five
footballers each kicking a ball in turn. The first team is placed on a
mountain pass where the wind is gusting capriciously, while the second
is in the sheltered prairie below enjoying a steadier breeze. Assume that
each team kicks the ball with identical strength (as it were, each boasts
an identical distribution of muscular legs). Assume further that the average
strength of wind gust is the same in each location; the only thing that
does differ between the two samples is the variance of those gusts. And
assume finally that the ball’s total acceleration is caused by the kicks and
wind gusts and nothing else, and that these two causes compose additively.
(See Tables 2 and 3—the r2 scores in these tables are for the correlation
in that sample between the respective input and the total acceleration.)
For each team, what is the average causal efficacy of their kicks? In
the absolute CEabs sense, it is clearly 12 in both cases, since for both teams
this is the average extra acceleration imparted to the ball by kicking.
What is the average CEabs of the wind? Again, the average is the same in
each sample, namely 15.
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TABLE 2. MOUNTAIN TEAM.
Player
Force
of Kick
Strength
of Wind
Total
Acceleration
One 6 15 21
Two 12 25 37
Three 9 10 19
Four 18 5 23
Five 15 20 35
Mean 12 15 27
Variance 18 50 56
r2 score .143 .691 . . .
TABLE 3. PRAIRIE TEAM.
Player
Force
of Kick
Strength
of Wind
Total
Acceleration
Six 6 15 21
Seven 12 17 29
Eight 9 14 23
Nine 18 13 31
Ten 15 16 31
Mean 12 15 27
Variance 18 2 17.6
r2 score .891 .018 . . .
What of the CErel sense of efficacy? I suggest a relation between CEabs
and CErel of
CE p CE /E ,rel abs tot
where Etot is the total effect. This captures CErel’s relativization of a cause’s
own impact to the total amount of ‘noise’. Then each team’s CErel of
kicking the ball would be: average CEabs/average Etot p 12/27. Likewise,
the average CErel of the wind would be 15/27, and this too is the same
for both teams.
In other words, on either understanding of causal efficacy the average
scores for kicking and the wind are plausibly the same in each sample.
However, the r2 results tell a very different story. Remember, the r2 be-
tween, say, kicking and the total acceleration is supposed to tell us the
CErel of the former with respect to the latter. We have just calculated this
CErel to be 12/27 in both samples. But the r
2 scores for each sample are,
respectively, 0.143 and 0.891. Likewise, whereas the CErel of the wind is
15/27 for both samples, the relevant r2 scores are 0.691 and 0.018. What
has happened?
The answer, of course, lies in the different variances of the wind in the
two samples. Since the average wind strength is the same each time, so
also were the average causal efficacies with respect to the level of the ball’s
acceleration. The difference in variances is irrelevant if we are concen-
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trating on levels, but not if we are concentrating on variance. In the first
sample most of the variance in the ball’s acceleration is due to variance
in the wind rather than variance in the kicking, while in the second it is
the other way around. Thus, with respect to the proportion (CErel) it
contributed to the variance of the ball’s total acceleration, the kicking was
not efficacious in the first sample but very efficacious in the second, and
it is this asymmetry that is being picked up by r2. Similarly, the wind’s
own asymmetric r2 scores reflect the much greater proportion of the total
variance it accounted for in the first compared to the second sample.
So the adequacy of r2 seems to depend on what we are interested in.
We already saw that it only captures CErel rather than CEabs. Now it is
also apparent that it only captures a focus on variance rather than levels.
This is a serious restriction since it seems likely that in practice we are
usually more interested in the level not variance of an effect, and in all
such instances the r2 measure of causal efficacy is therefore inappropriate.
For example, presumably we are less often concerned about the impact
of smoking on the variance of life expectancy rather than just on life
expectancy itself. Nevertheless, what if we did happen to be interested
both in CErel and in the variance of the ball’s acceleration? In these fa-
vorable albeit unusual circumstances at least, would r2 not finally capture
just what we want? But I shall now argue that, even here, an adjusted
version of our own formula is preferable.
5. Adapting Our Formula. Recall from Section 2 our formula for CEabs:
. It is easily converted into a candidate definitionE(C & W ) E(C & W )0
of CErel by normalizing with respect to the total effect, yielding a CErel
of C with respect to an effect E of11
[E(C & W ) E(C & W )]/E(C & W ).0
What of variances and levels? The key is to remember that our formula
is defined in terms of an effect term E, not explicitly in terms of level of
effect. We are therefore free simply to define E to be a variance if desired.
For example, rather than set Ep the ball’s acceleration, we can set Ep
the variance of the ball’s acceleration.
Combining these two maneuvers, we may now calculate, using our
adjusted formula, the CErel scores for each of kicking and wind in the
case where we are interested in the variance of the ball’s acceleration—
11. Taking C0 to be zero input, we were in effect already applying this adjusted formula
when calculating the CErel scores of 12/27 and 15/27 earlier.
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TABLE 4. CAUSAL EFFICACY SCORES FOR CErel,
E p VARIANCE.
Sample, Cause
Adjusted
Formula
r2
Score
Mountain, kick .107 .143
Mountain, wind .679 .691
Prairie, kick .886 .891
Prairie, wind .023 .018
in other words, the exact case where r2 is supposedly still appropriate.12
(See Table 4.)
Our formula, once adjusted for the CErel and effect-as-variance case,
therefore captures almost exactly the pattern of the r2 scores. But notice
a wrinkle: Our score in the second sample for the wind is not just very
low, as with r2, but is actually negative. This reflects the fact that the
variance of the ball’s acceleration would actually be higher without the
addition of the wind at all, in other words that in the second sample
Var(kicking) 1 Var(ball’s acceleration) and in effect the wind is acting as
a mild stabilizer. That is, introducing the wind actually lowers the variance
of the ball’s acceleration. But r2 is unable to reflect this explicitly (see
Section 6 below for more on why). The point is not that we are necessarily
interested in this particular nuance, but rather that we might be, and only
our formula captures it.
Consider now the CEabs scores for the effect-as-variance case. (See Table
5.) In particular, notice another wrinkle when comparing the pattern of
these to that of the r2 scores, namely that the wind now scores higher in
the first sample than does the kicking in the second. Intuitively, this is
because in the second sample kicking captures a large proportion of a
small total variance, whereas in the first the wind—although in absolute
terms varying more—now proportionally captures less because the overall
total is larger. Thus the CEabs version of our formula is reflecting the
12. Let X p force of kick, Y p strength of wind, and Z p ball’s acceleration, and
throughout choose a counterfactual of zero input. Then:
Mountain sample:
1. CErel of kicking p [Var(ZFX & Y)  Var(ZFY)]/Var(ZFX & Y) p (56  50)/
56 p 0.107. The CEabs score of kicking, listed in Table 5, is thus 56  50 p 6.
The corresponding r 2 score, of 0.143, is taken from Table 2.
2. CErel of wind p [Var(ZFX & Y)  Var(ZFX)]/Var(ZFX & Y) p (56  18)/56
p 0.679. CEabs of wind p 56  18 p 38.
Prairie sample:
1. CErel of kicking p [Var(ZFX & Y)  Var(ZFY)]/Var(ZFX & Y) p (17.6  2)/
17.6 p 0.886. CEabs of kicking p 17.6  2 p 15.6.
2. CErel of wind p [Var(ZFX & Y)  Var(ZFX)]/Var(ZFX & Y) p (17.6  18)/
17.6 p 0.023. CEabs of wind p 17.6  18 p 0.4.
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TABLE 5. CAUSAL EFFICACY SCORES FOR CEabs,
E p VARIANCE.
Sample, Cause
Adjusted
Formula
r2
Score
Mountain, kick 6 .143
Mountain, wind 38 .691
Prairie, kick 15.6 .891
Prairie, wind .4 .018
absolute smallness of kicking’s variation in the second sample, and r2 by
contrast its relative (to the total variation) largeness. We may or may not
be interested in the first of these rather than the second. If not, we could
simply revert to our formula’s CErel formulation. Indeed with sufficient
ingenuity it would no doubt be possible to gerrymander a version of our
formula that reproduced the r2 results exactly. But why bother? What
really matters is to get a measure flexible enough to capture always just
that in which we are interested antecedently, and for that our formula is
much preferable to the less flexible r2.
6. Second Problem: Counterfactuals. A second key advantage of our for-
mula is that it facilitates flexibility not just with respect to choice of effect
term but also with respect to choice of counterfactual. In our calculations
above, all the counterfactuals were the simplest one—just a factor’s ab-
sence. But suppose we wished to assess the impact, say, of the mountain
team’s kicking compared not to its absence but rather compared to the
prairie team’s? That is, how much difference would it make switching
from one team to the other? Of course, by assumption the two teams are
identical with respect to kicking, and so such a swap would not make
any difference at all. Our formula reflects this naturally and immediately,
even in the case most favorable to r2, namely the CErel sense of causal
efficacy with respect to the variance of the ball’s acceleration. For that
circumstance, our formula yields for the CErel of the mountain rather than
the prairie team:
[(Var (ball’s acceleration)giventhe mountain team&mountainwinds)
 (Var (ball’s acceleration)giventhe prairie team&mountainwinds)]
/(Var (ball’s acceleration)giventhe mountain team&mountainwinds)
p (56 56)/56p 0.
Just this kind of calculation is crucial whenever we are considering in-
terventions. In particular, here it licenses the (in this case trivial) recom-
mendation that, were we to replace the mountain with the prairie team,
it would make no difference to the variance of the ball’s acceleration up
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there. More widely, such analysis of the impact of interventions is crucial
to policymaking.13
Normally at least one term in our formula will be a counterfactual—
what would happen to E if we changed one input, keeping the others (W)
constant? It is crucial when assessing interventions to get the choice of
background conditions in this counterfactual exactly right, and that in
turn requires our formula’s controlled-experiment sensibility. In this ex-
ample, that meant in particular that we retained the same background
profile of wind gusts all the way through the calculation. A second point
is that we must also insert the correct C0 of interest. For instance, moving
some other, stronger-legged, team up into the mountains probably would
have made a difference after all. A similar story can be told about any
intervention—always we wish to assess the likely consequences of that
intervention, comparing it either to doing nothing or to the consequences
of some alternative intervention. In each case, this implies evaluation of
correctly chosen counterfactuals.
More generally, whenever we start to apply knowledge via interventions,
considerations of causation become inevitable, and Pearson’s acausal
dream breaks down (Pearl 2000). Neither r2 nor ANOVA, in contrast to
our formula, incorporates the notion of a counterfactual at all—indeed
this is one of the positivist virtues Pearson insisted upon. But the cost is
to render them unsuitable for assessing interventions. Perhaps it might
be thought that just subtracting one team’s r2 score from the other’s would
yield us straightforwardly the impact of switching between them. But the
problem is that in order to set this up correctly in general it is necessary
to incorporate a controlled-experiment sensibility, and it is just this that
the acausally conceived statistical measures cannot do. To see why not,
imagine now analyzing in terms of r2 our intervention above of using the
mountain team in place of the prairie one. If we follow the strategy of
just subtracting the r2 scores from each other, we find:
2 2(r of mountain team’s kicking) (r of prairie team’s kicking)
p 0.143 0.891p 0.748,
13. Of course, for practical purposes a policymaker would also likely wish to know
about underlying mechanisms—why did an intervention lead to the quantity of effect
that it did? But such considerations are methodological; they do not impinge on the
conceptual issue of how to define causal efficacy in the first place.
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which is of course different from zero. What has gone wrong?14 The answer
is that we have not controlled for varying background conditions, in
particular for varying winds. The right-hand term should be what the
counterfactual r2 of the prairie team’s kicking would have been given
mountain winds, but the only r2 for the prairie team actually available
was that for the steady breeze of the prairie. The greatly reduced wind
variance in the prairie means that the same kicking profile is much more
relatively important there, which is reflected in the r2 score. But for the
purpose of calibrating the intervention of swapping the teams only (and
not the winds), this is irrelevant. The result is that crudely comparing r2
scores cannot deliver the assessment of causal efficacy we require.
The overall picture is that even in their most favorable case—i.e. CErel
and the variance of effect—the statistical measures again fall short, this
time over the issue of choice of counterfactual. The underlying reason is
their lack of causal sensibility, and hence lack of sensitivity to the im-
portance of keeping background conditions constant.
7. Conclusion. Statistical reports of causal efficacy, if based on r2 or
ANOVA, should be treated with great caution. They offer no reliable
substitute for the hard work of establishing quantitative causal results.
Through an appropriate choice of effect term or counterfactual, our
own formula is flexible and deft enough to capture whichever particular
causal efficacy we happen to be interested in. In contrast, the two statistical
measures are unable to capture CEabs. Moreover, their rigidly acausal
nature also leaves them inadequate even in the ostensibly friendlier ter-
ritory of CErel. First, in causal contexts, an inflexible fixation on variance
rather than levels is frequently inappropriate. And second, the lack of a
causally inspired controlled experiment sensibility leaves them unable to
analyze potential interventions reliably. At heart, as instruments for mea-
suring causal efficacy, they are still suffering from Pearson’s wrong turning
of 100 years ago.
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